Review of Runge's "Discourse Grammar of the Greek New Testament" Pt 8
For some odd reason, a few months back the thought crossed
my mind: Humans don’t eat humans (for
the most part), so, isn’t it weird that animals eat animals? In the end, I guess it’s not all that odd but
the initial though kind of made me pause and ponder the concept for a few
minutes. Now, this may be a very crude
analogy, but it is something that helps me understand the concept of “Metacomments”
(denoted by the symbol V) which
Runge talks about in Pt 2/Ch 5. Runge defines a metacomment as the occasion “When
speakers stop saying what they are saying in order to comment on what is going to
be said, speaking abstractly about it” (101).
In other words, it is the act of commenting on a forthcoming
comment. So, how does my analogy above
relate? Well, like metalanguage, which
is using language to describe language (an act of turning language in on
itself) and metacomments, which is using comments to describe comments (an act
of turning comments in on themselves), it is helpful for me to picture this in
my mind like the act of humans or animals turning in on themselves. Of course, it is much more abstract; it is
language or comments turning in on themselves.
So, if I were to replace my thoughts a few months back with “comments”
instead of animals, I might have wondered:
“Isn’t it odd that comments can turn in on themselves?”
Now, maybe that is not at all helpful to you; I warned you,
it is a crude analogy. Yet, it works for
me. A comment turned in on itself is
nothing more than a comment about a comment.
Think of it as a two-part comment, let’s say, Part A and Part B. In a metacomment, both parts are
comments. However, A is commenting on
B. For example, if Part B was the
comment “going to church is important” then Part A, the metacomment, could be “I
want you to know that…” This forms the
whole sentence: “VI want you to know thatV going to church is important.” The
comment “going to church is important” could stand on its own, but I have
interrupted and slowed down the sentence thereby drawing attention to it, by
using the metacomment “I want you to know that…”
Jesus uses metacomments when he says things like “Truly I
say to you” or “ It has been said” or “I tell you the truth”. Runge contends that metacomments like these “are
used to introduce significant propositions, ones to which the writer or speaker
wants to attract extra attention” (102).
The key marker for distinguishing whether a comment is indeed a
metacomment or not, is to determine if the “speaker is interrupting what is
being talked about in order to comment on what is going to be talked about”
(102). Since this is the case, the
metacomment could essentially be removed from the text “without substantially
altering the propositional content” (102).
This challenges the old Form Critical readings of the NT which asserted
that many such coments were disclosure, request, petition or introduction
formulas (103).
In addition to this claim, Runge’s following suggestions are
well-received. Metacomments 1) Function
as indicators regarding the author’s intent, and 2) Help readers understand
both the text and the author’s stance towards the text (or what is being said)
(105). Thus, when Paul says “I want you
to know” or “I do not wish you to be ignorant”, this helps readers both
understand Paul’s intent as well as the position he takes on what is being said
(106).
According to Runge, “Metacomments are often used to create a
mitigated form of a command, one that makes the point less directly than does
an imperative verb form” (107). It is
akin to saying to someone, “Now, I want you to listen and listen real good” or “Now,
I want you to think about this before you answer”. These are mitigated forms of commands; they
do not demand that the hearers do these things but they do contain a sort of
implicit expectation that indeed, they will, without question, do them. So, metacomments can strengthen exhortations,
highlight new boundaries in a discourse, slow down or create a pause in a
discourse and emphasize subsequent propositions. Think of it as a type of “dramatic pause”
(112) in the discourse.
Additionally, there are a number of fpds (forward-pointing
devices) such as redundant vocatives and purposeful attention-getters (117-22). A great example of redundant vocatives is
found in Eph 6.1, 4-5, where Paul addresses the Ephesians with the following
vocatives: ta. te,kna (children!), oi` pate,rej (fathers!) and oi` dou/loi (slaves!). As for the attention-getting fpds, Runge
lists a handful: ivdou, (behold!), avmh,n (truly!), avlhqw/j (certainly!), ouvai,
u`mi/n (woe to you!), o]j e;cei w=ta
avkou,ein (let whoever has ears…!).
There is much value in what Runge is presenting here! I do wonder if metacomments, in addition to
looking forward, can also look backward.
For example, in class someone drew attention to 1 Cor 12.19ff the other
day, where Paul says, “we have been speaking…”
Certainly, this points forward but in some real sense, it also points
backward. Can a metacomment function this
way? It does seem to meet the criteria
of interrupting the discourse so as to comment on a comment (or comments), but
it is not merely forward-pointing. Also,
I wonder, along with one of my professors, Fred Long, if Runge has considered in any
depth the occasion when a metacomment might point forward to something else
that points backward (e.g. 1 Cor 14.39, 15.58).
These are just a few questions I have at this point. As I continue to read through this grammar, I
am all the more excited about recommending it to you. So, if you haven’t yet, surf your way over toLogs and get your copy.
Oh, and by the way, here are the preceding seven parts of
this series:
Comments
Post a Comment